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LOGIC OF EMOTIONS
BY HENRY LANZ
SEPARATION of meaning from the psychological nature of
ideas belongs to the most secure generalisations of modern philo-
sophical science. It seems now quite natural that after the emanci-
pation of logic from the control of psychology we should expect a
similar reform for other branches of philosophy, especially for
ethics and aesthetics. Modern philosophical literature moves un-
mistakably in the direction of the reform. And yet no definite re-
sults can be possibly obtained along those lines unless it is positively
demonstrated—as it was demonstrated in logic—that our desires,
impulses, and emotions also have an objective, "neutral" content
which is in the same sense independent of our consciousness as the
truth of a proposition is independent of its flash in the mind of one
who discovers it. It is the purpose of this paper to advance some
evidence of "neutrality" for the province of emotions, especially for
certain groups of emotions which have definite artistic significance.
By analysing the nature and origin of certain emotional concom-
itants in music and poetry along the lines suggested by Hanslick
and Liddell, I believe it is possible to show that psychological bodies
of emotions, such as, melodies, rhythms, and rimes, have certain
a
—
psychological or neutral nuclei—an analogon of meaning—which
remain constant and can be identically transmitted from one indi-
vidual to another. Those nuclei are by no means simple, homo-
genous entities, but complex bodies showing intricate organization
based on certain laws—such as the laws of harmony, for instance
—
which impart to them a character of specific necessity. Where "spe-
cific necessities" exist there must be a general body of principles
which apply to all groups and all individual cases. And, although
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the material to which this body of laws applies is—as we shall see
—
allogical and cannot be expressed in propositions
;
yet the laws them-
selves constitute a system which is theoretical in nature. This sys-
tem then,—as applied to emotions,—may be properly called "logic
of emotions". Certain fundamental propositions from it I hope to be
able to establish here.
Psychologists define emotions as a feeling of bodily changes
which follow the perception of some exciting fact.^ Bodily changes
which form the psychological basis for the rise of emotions are very
varied, possibly innumerable. The change of heart beats and the
tempo of breathing, visserial stirring and flushing of the face, cer-
tain contractions of muscles and, above all, certain chemical changes
in various glands, produce internal sensations accompanied by various
shades of pleasant or unpleasant feeling. Such m.ental complexes we
call emotions.- Recent research into the matter has shown con-
clusively that our emotional life depends largely on the chemistry of
the organism. If this is the case, the field of emotions must be con-
siderably wider than it is popularly believed. For, what does not
cause a chemical change in our organism? Every perception, every
slightest sensation must be accompanied by processes of composi-
tif'U and decomposition of organic substances within certain cells.
And indeed, it has been a long established fact in psychology that all
our sensations, and possibly perceptions, are accompanied bv a slight
feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness. It is w^hat Germans call
Gcfi'ihlston. Every sound, every hue, every shade of red or i.lue,
has its specific emotional appeal which by no means consists of mere
pleasantness or unpleasantness. For sensations may bo pleasant or
unpleasant in as many different ways as proposit'ons may be true
or false. In fact, the reference to ])leasure does not adcf[natcly de-
scribe the innumerable differences in oi r emotional response. The
monotonous sound of a cricket on a still night may be just as pleas-
ant—or as annoying if you wish-—as a prolonged practice of the
same musical phrase on a piano. Yet both are so totally different
from each other that the slight variation in the intensity of pleasure
derived from them is insufficient to express the difference. Both sit-
uations, although equally pleasant, or equally annoying display dif-
ferent emotional contents.
Considering these differences we must say that the range of
nV. James. Ps\choloq\. Vol. 2. p. 449.
2E. B. Tichencr, An Outline of Psychology, p. 229 ff.
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emotions reaches considerably farther than our emotional vocabulary
is able to follow. We have but few words referring to our emotional
life. Love, hate, fear, alarm, hope, anxiety and a couple of dozen
others make tha,t portion of our emotional life which appe?rs prac-
tically important and is discussed in the text books of psychology.
The larger bulk of our emotions remain for ever nameless. And
yet, it is precisely those nameless emotions which supply material for
the domain of art. Of all these I shall here briefly consider (1)
musical and (2) certain poetical emotions.
1. Melody is a form of emotional response. The tonal ma-
terial that affects our ear is not melody. Hearing alone does not
constitute what we call a musical ear. Beethoven was deaf, and
nonetheless he remains the greatest master of music. But play one
of his sonatas to a Bushman, who hears distinctly every single tone,
and he will not be able to hear the melody. For stricily speaking,
one does not hear a melody. One is able or imable to follow it,
which means that one either has, or has not, the ability to organize
the tones into a higher unity. This organization is accomplished
emotionally. Emotion is the cement that binds various parts of the
melody together.
A crucial test of the correctness of the assumption that melody
is a form of emotional response consists in the psycho-physical
analysis of its origin as it is given by Helmholtz. His theory briefly
stated is this : Simple musical tones do not exist in nature ; every
tone is accompanied by a series of the so-called overtones. There-
fore, listening to a musical sound we never perceive a single note, but
a whole chord. If "do" is intoned by voice or any musical instrument
we can clearly detect "sol" in its sound. "Mi" is heard less dis-
tinctly, although quite audibly, even without assistance of any tone-
intensifying device. Thus, natural concomitants of "do" are "sol"
and "mi" which together with the original "do" form the so-called
major chord. In the infancy of music, therefore, a transition from
one tone to another was most probably determined by the fact that the
second tone was indistinctly heard together with the original. For
this reason the most natural melodical transition is from "do" to
"sol". This transition is indeed the foundation of all melodic mo-
tion, so to speak, the nwdel melody. But as soon as the second note
of the interval is actually taken, or even heard, a strong impulse is
born in our mind to return to the original tone. This impulse is the
real origin of melody. It may be immediately satisfied in the most
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primitive way by a direct return to the tonic, or else the motion may
be executed by n^eans of another note that would lead the voice
to the original tone. In the later case a feeling of suspense is pro-
duced that modifies the original craving for return. This craving
can be intensified and varied in many different ways producing
innumerable melodies from the sweetest Italian tunes to the most
phantastic intuitions by Skriabin. Psychologically, therefore, melody
is nothing .else than a variety of desire, a longing or craving. It is
not—I am aware—an expression of some heterogeneous desire,
such as love, longing for God, or moonlight, or what not, which the
composer is supposed to transmit to us. He does not transmit any-
thing except his immediate and perfectly unique desire to move from
one tone to another, which is melody.
There are till now, and—I am afraid—there always will be,
many dilletantic enthusiasts of music who maintain that when they
hear Beethoven's Aloonlight Sonata they visualise a sort of lonely
landscape flooded with moonlight. One would say that the landscape
is lonely, the other would insist that you are supposed to see angels
moving about, etc. It is popularly believed that it belongs to the
intelligent listening of musical compositions to have stories con-
nected with them. And thus forgetting music people fabricate their
stories. Romantic aesthetics contributed much to this popular mis-
understanding bestowing upon it the air of philosophical profund-
ity. Even Plegel.—the sanest of all
—
, believes that music is a form
of expressing truth, namely the inner truth of the subjective.^ For
Schopenhauer music becomes the language of the imiverse. And
following Schopenhauer, Wagner,—this protagonist of philosophical
music,— declares that music is of feminine character in that she
conceives and bears a meaning that is given to her from the outside.''
In all these theories there is very little new. They are all but vari-
ations of an idea handed over to us frcMii grey anti(|uity which, with
the words of Plotinus, says that "music dealing with rhythms and
harmonies is but a copy of the real music, which in the realm of
"HcRcl defines music as a "rnmantic art" characterized by a complete re-
tiremi-nt into the subjective: Die Ilauplsachc dcr Musik uini dcshalb darin
bcslrhcn iiiclit die Cciicnsldndlichkcit srihst, so)idcr)! iiit GciiciilhcH die Art
mid IVeisc zi'irdrrkliiuirn cu lassrn ,i>i Wi'lchcr das iniicrstc Sclbst seiiur
Siibrfi7'itiil und idcrUcr Scclc nach bcwrnt. {IlciicJ, I'orlcsuiu/rii iibrr die Aes-
thctik. p. 189.
^Wapner, fhis It'esen dcr Opera "AlJez iinisikulische ()r<iauisiiius isl Xatur
nach 7ceib!iclier; er ist iiur ein fiebiirender. nieht aber zeugender : die :;cu(ieude
Kraft ausser Hint" (p. -83). Wagner maintains that it lies in Drama.
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mind, deals with the ideal rhythm."'
In contrast to this romantic interpretation Hanslick advances
his formal and objective interpretation of melody. In his work
"Vom Musikalische Schonen" he assumes that the principle of music
must be "specifically musical" i. e., it lies exclusively in the relation
and affinity of tones involved and not in any ideas or emotions that,
being foreign to the tonal material, are somehow expressed in it.
"If one asks what is expressed in the tonal material of a melody,
the answer is : musical ideas. And a wholly actualized musical idea
is an independent manifestation of beauty and end in itself, and not
merely a means or material for expressing thoughts, or feelings".
Under the stress of polemic Hanslick goes to the extreme saying
that the content of it is purely "tonal". It is, however, emotional
;
not in the sense that it brings to expression some human
emotions, such as love, joy, etc., which exists independently of music,
but in the sense that it forms itself a group of specific emotion^
which do not, strictly speaking, find their expression in music, but
simply exist as 'inusic.
Carefully perusing "Voni musikalisch Schonen" one comes tu
the conclusion that the author anticipates the realistic point of view
in aesthetics. He objects to "feeling", not because he wishes to de-
fend the sensualistic point of view reducing melody to the accoustic
sensations, but rather because he finds in it something more definite
and more permanent than both sensations, and feelings. He de-
mands for beauty the same thing as Bolzano demanded for truth
:
an existence "an sich", an objective validity that would be independ-
ent of our consciousness. Quite in accordance with the Husserlean
phenomenology Hanslick says : "Das Schone, ist atid hleiht sch'ofi,
audi ivcnn as keine Gefiihle erseugt, ja zvenn es zueder geschaut,
nocJi hetrachtet zvird". And
—
going a bit farther—we may say that
melody remains melody even if there is nobody to listen to it. As a
neutral entity it retains its musical content. For, to be sure, it
does not spring into existence every time it is performed, and does
not vanish into nothingness every time a performer ends his pro-
gramme. As a beautiful form it is valid all the time, or rather
out of time,— eternally.
2. Another large class of emotions is produced by words. Words
afifect us .emotionally in four different ways : by sound, by rhythm,
by meaning, and by associations. The latter two, meaning and asso-
5Enn. 5;9, 11.
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ciations, are generally considered the most vitally important. Trans-
mission of meaning is, of course, the chief function of words. Yet
there are emotional concomitants connected even with the most ab-
stract meaning. Every logical form throw^s its shadow into the
land of emotions. It is thos€ shadows that make our driest ab-
stractions appear beautiful. Even geometrical theorems are not
entirely deprived of this subtle beauty. For do not mathematicians
often speak of the intrinsic ellegance of their proves and beauty of
geometrical constructions? And, perhaps, it is the purest, barest
form of beauty, that made a modern poet, in a humble resignation,
exclaim
:
Euclid alone has looked on Beauty bare. . .
Great mathematicians are great artists even in spite of themselves.
Yet meaning is the business of words. And it is the business of
business to be unemotional. The largest part of emotions stimu-
lated by w^ords come not from meaning, but from associations. An
idea may be expressed in a business like form in which only those
words are used as are necessary to convey the meaning desired. Or
the same idea may be expressed in what we call a poetic form which
•ippeals— to use Liddells phrase—to our human interest. Thus, the
content of every verbal expression is not merely logical, but logical
pli:? emotional, or in Eidilell's abbreviation:
X=HI
This however, is not sufficient to express the emotional content
associated with a linguistic form. With every phrase there are
connected not merely those emotions which are caused by associa-
tions and which are remembered from our previous experience,
but also those subtle and transient emotional fragments which are
connected with the sound, rhythm and physiognomy of words.
Reason has moons, but moons not hers
Lie mirrored on her sea.
Confounding her astronomers,
But, oh, delighting me!
Everv poem, every phrase has such satellites of alogical formation
that revolve aroinul the meaning and the sound of words. Liddcl
calls it verse form, VF. Tn our every day conversation, where
meaning stays in the foregroiuid, those emotional satellites are ordi-
narily too small and are too far removed from the center of attention
to be notices.
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The words of most men kiss
With satiated famiharity
says the poet in Bodenheim's "Impulsive Dialogue". Yet there are
means to make words emotionally more prominent. Those means
consist largely of rhythm and rime.
(a) Rhythm in poetry does not exactly coincide with what is
called metre. The latter is but a dead, academic form that is never
followed in real poetry. From metrical point of view the first two
verses in "Paradise Lost"
:
Of Man's first disobedience and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste. . . .
are iambic pentametre which counts five unaccented and five accented
syllables. In actual reading, however, the accents of the second
foot of the first line are reversed, for "first" is no doubt accented.
The fourth foot has no accent at all, for nobody would read "and"
with an accent. "That" of the second line is but slightly accented ; in
ordinary speech it would not be accented at all. Such interruptions
of regular rhythm are by no means exceptional. They exist in all
languages. Reading of poetry would be unbearably monotonous, if
we strictly followed the m.etrical scheme. The reading quality of
a verse depends largely on distribution of such interruptions. There
are hues that move with solemn dignity ; others that read with ease
and playful ellegance ; some that are sung, and others again that
move heavily, with almost alarming gravity, as for instance, the
first line of "Paradise Lost". A five-feet iambic verse with a trachec
on the first foot such as
:
Sing, Heavenly Muse, that on the secret top
is quite difi'-erent in its rhythmic character, than the one that has a
throchee on the second foot, such as the first line of the "Paradise
Lost". A line that has no accent on the second foot reads difiFerently
from the one that has a similar interruption on the fourth. The
difference in rhythm causes, and largely determines, the difference
in our emotional response to a line as a whole. And this emotional
response depends, not merely on the metre, nor even on the fact
that there are interruptions, but largely on where those interruptions
take place.
Following the methods used by a Russian scholar-poet, Andrei
Belyi, for recording rhythms, I am giving here a table for a compara-
tive study of English, Russian and German rhythms. I have se-
lected thirty v.erse-lines in each language taken respectively from
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Milton's "Paradise Lost", Goethe's 'Tanst", and Pushkin's "Boris
Godunov", all of which are written in iambic pentametre. Each
verse-line is represented by five cells corresponding- to the numbei
of feet contained in it. If a line follows correctly the metrical form
retaining- alternating accents on each foot, all five spaces are left
blank. A foot that lacks accent is marked by a • . A cross stands
for a spondee, and trochees are represented by circles. An added
syllable (anapestic foot) is marked by a triangle.
Table 1 represents the first thirty verses from "Paradise Lost",
Tt contains a very large number of trocheeic feet (reversed accent)
which for the most part fall on the first foot. Of the thirty lines
twelve have trochees and six spondees.
Talile 2 represents thirty lines from Goethe's "Fa'ist".
Ich griissc di'rJi, dn ci)izigc PhioJc!
Die tcJi niit .^hidacht nun hcruntcrhole,
In dir vcrehr' ich Mcnschenwitz und Kunst.
Dn Inhcgn'ff dcr holdcn Schlummersdfte
,
The nunilier of trochees is considerably smaller. The number of
syllables which ha\e but a very slight accent is considerably in-
creased. Those interruptions fall largely on the second and third
feet which makes a line symmetrical, and gives it a szving. Such
lines as:
Und froJi ist zvcnn er Reaenicihijicr findct
which is superbly Gothean, affording greatest rhythmical satisfaction
on account, no doubt, of the symmetrical distribution of accents.
Table 3 represents a part of the fountain scene from "Boris
Godunox" which in English transliteration, reads:
Ten Groznoro mcnya nsynovUa,
DiDiitri' on !.: groha uarekla,
Vokroog menya narody vozinntila
I w zhevtvii nine Borisa otdala.
The trochees are entirely absent. There are neither spondees nor
dactyls. The rhythm is perfectly clear and transparent. Tt consists
exclusively of interruptions which are quite distinct and well pro-
nounced.
Comparing these three tables one can clearly see the difference
in the rhythmic structure of different languages. English rhvthms
arc exceptionally rich, and offer to a poet a wider range of possi-
bilities. German and Russirui rliytlinis are less complex, but more
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Paradise Lost,
1-32.
Faust
690-721
Boris Godunov,
1-32
•
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symmetric and musical. Each horizontal line in our diagram indi-
cates a rhythmic figure which tends to produce a special emotional
response. In many cases two or three lines are symmetrically ar-
ranged so that they form larger rhythmical units. Thus, for in-
stance., the 10th, 11th, and 12th lines of the first diagram form a
"figure". The 14th, 15th, and 16th lines form another symmetrical
figure. This symmetry unconsciously felt, gives in reading a great
deal of satisfaction, such as
:
That with no middle flight intends to soar
Above th' Aonian mount, while it pursues
Things unattempted yet in prose and rime
Good German poetry is full of such symmetrical figures. It is
sufficient to compare graphically. Goethe with some minor German
poets in order to see how much Goethe's verse gains by constant re-
currence of symmetrical figures. In reading, our emotional response
to each different figure is dift'erent. Those differences cannot be ex-
pressed in propositions. Their meaning and emotional significance
can be grasped only by listening to the words as actually pronounced.
Each five-space line of the diagram represents a specific rhythmical
figure with a specific emotional content attached to it. But it has no
logical value, for it abides with the sound and not with the meaning
of words.
(b) Another groop of emotional contents associated with words
are introduced by rime.
It is well known that human vowels are tone-clusters in which
each component sound has a specific intensity. Among the variously
intoned over-tones, however, there is for each vowel one characteris-
tic frequency constant to which falls the larger part of the energy
of the sound. It is the tone which is intensified by the sympathetic
vibration of the mouth cavity. It has been proven by experiments
that this tone remains constant for every pitch of voice. Thus, in
a very precise, and not at all metaphorical sense our vowels produce
music. When we speak, the vowel-tones produce a gentle ac-
companiment to our speech which only lacks certain unity, or or-
ganization to become a melody. It is a continuous flow of subdued
musical sound, a sort of "infinite melody" in Wagnerian sense, that
is gently whispered into our ear by the vanishing vowels. If we
agree to neglect the disturbing influence of consonants, we may
represent the musical content of a phrase in common musical signs.
The analysis of the following lines from Wordsworth may serve as
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an illustration
:
Hail, Zaragoza ! If with unwet eyes
We can approach, thy sorrow to behold,
Yet is the heart not pitiless nor cold
;
Such spectacle demands not tear or sigh.
The vowels of this fragment, when pronounced, contain the
following melody
:
b* b,
ife:
:Z9=
Such, or approximately such, melody is actually contained in the
above lines. If by some appropriate physical device we were in
position to intensify the characteristic over-tones of every vowel, wc
might be able to hear the melody directly at its source. By playing
it on the piano, or some other musical instrument, one may obtain
but a very imperfect reproduction of it.
If, as we have seen, an harmonic deviation, from a well per-
ceived musical tone is bound to produce in our mind a feeling of
alienation and a desire to go back to the original tone, there are rea-
sons to believe that an indistinct musical tone, such as perceived, for
instance, in a vowel, will produce the same effect, only in a smaller
degree. The phenomenon of assonance or inner rime, corroborates
this view. There is a great deal of satisfaction connected with the
return to the same vowel. As I have shown elsewhere,® the ten-
dency to repeat the same vowel at the end of the next line (or alter-
nativelv) i. .e., the desire for rime, is from the musical point of
view nothing else than a tendency to close a verse in the same key
in which it was begim. This tendency finds its expression psycho-
logicallv in a slight emotional excitement which becomes decidedly
"pleasing' and "satisfying", if the phrase ends in rime. Thus, rime
may be properly defined as the unity of key in a melody of vozvels.
It is quite obvious that rime is not concerned with the meaning of
words, but with its form, which is emotional. It lies within the plane
of a-logical cross-section of the verse. Just for this reason it often
appears "mysterious",—a ''work of genius", which is too dazzling
sHenry Lanz ; "The Physical Basis of Rime. (Publ. of Language Associa-
tion of America, 1926).
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for our intellect to follow. The fact is, however, that being itself
not intellectual it is not at all unreasonable. It belongs to the form,
the external appearance,
—
poets call it "dress"—of a poem, which
is in the same time the innerest substance of poetry. Deprived of
this charming dress a poem often becomes ugly and ridiculous,—
a
direct contrast to what one would call poetical. At any event, if
not completely distorted, the general tone of a poem deprived of
rime becomes quite different from the original. Here is w'hat O. W.
Holmes says on poetry
:
And most of all, the pure ethereal fire.
Which seems to radiate from the poets lyre
Is to the world a mystery and a charm,
And Aegis wielded on a mortal's arm.
While reason turns her dazzled eyes away
;
And bows her sceptre to her subjects sway;
And thus the poet clothed with godlike state,
I'surped his Maker's title—to create;
He, whose thoughts, differing not in shape, but dress,
\\^hat others feel more fitlv can express
Now take the "riming dress" from this charming fragment ! 1
shall ask mv condescending reader to have patience to read the
same lines once more without rime
:
And most of all the pure ethereal flame
Which seems to radiate from the poet's lyre
Is to the world a mystery and a lure.
And Aegis wielded on a mortal's arm.
While reason turns away her dazzled eyes
And bows her sceptre to her subjects sway;
He, whose thought differing not in shape, but dress
What others feel more fitly can pronounce.
I have changed only three words in the above fragment selecting
those which are equally, or even more poetical, (substituting "flame"
for "fire", and "lure" for "charm".) And yet it sounds almost as a
caricature on Holmes poetic eulogy.
Thus, the emotional effect produced by the melody of vowels is
far from negligible. Homeopathic doses are sometimes the most
effective ones. Think how many private lives were ruined by inner
rime quite accidentally contained in the harmless formula: "seven
—
eleven". It is sufficient to remind one on such expressions as:
"freedom and liberty" or "cash and carry", so show that rhythms
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and rimes quite powerfully interfere with the affairs of our political
and practical life. They are fit to electrify masses.
* ^: *
We have considered three groups of emotional contents : melody,
rhythm and rime. They the particularly fit to serve our purposes
of proving that emotions—like ideas—also have neutral content
:
for they not merely have a content, but allow their content to be sym-
bolically represented in signs. One reason why the content of "ideas"
was so early ci"ystallised into "concepts" was that the meaning of
ideas was attached to words. The symbolic value of words makes
the neutral nuclei of ideas stand forth more prominently. Emotions
on the whole lack this advantage. The path that leads our mind
from "Satz to sich" to "Warheit an sich" was not available for those
who ventured into the field of emotions. That is the reason why
their neutrality remains largely obscured .even now. And for the
same reason those groups of emotions which allow sematological
treatment are very important.
It may be objected, however, that strictly speaking it is not the
emotional content that can be expressed in signs, but only a certain
arrangement and seqvience of sense-qualities. In writing down a
melody, for instance, musicians merely indicate the sequence of
tones in time ; emotional content remains beyond their reach, and
does not even belong to their intention.
And yet we nevertheless assume that in musical books, not
merely the sequence of tones, but melodies are written. And melody,
no doubt, is something more than a mere sequence of tones. It has a
content that goes beyond our acoustic sensations. Buying, for in-
stance, a piano transcription of "Boris Gudonov," I do it for the sake
of harmonies and melodies it contains, and not for : the acoustic
material ; for opera as performed on the stage has the same melodies,
but certainly different acoustic material as orchestra and singing
is quite different from what I am able to produce on my piano. If
it were the correct reproduction of tonal material, nobody would
ever buy piano transcriptions. It is evident that melody as a whole
including its specific emotional tension finds its expression in musi-
cal signs. The content of musical emotions are there. They are
as Germans would say "mithezeichnet". The same holds true with
regard to our symbolic representation of rhythms and rimes.
There is, I think, as much reason to believe that content of
emotions remains constant as there is reason to believe that logical
398 THE OPEX COURT
meanings never chang.e. For even if it were true that our response
to the sound of a melody is different every time, yet to know and
feel the difference we have got to have a standard of identity. Other-
wise the difference could not be seen or comprehended. This iden-
tity does not imply, however, that the content of each -emotion is
altogether "immutable". For we can not say that of our ideas either.
It is, for instance, quite impossible to live through emotional content
of given rime without in the same time considering rhythm and
meaning. The melody contained in a vers-e is never given in an iso-
lated form. And the impression produced by a given rime depends
largely on the general impression derived from the whole poem, on
the expressiveness of reading, musical quality of the voice, as well
as the temporary mood of the reader or listener himself. It seems
that at every particular moment we can have only one emotion in
which various emotional contents fuse together. And yet that is no
argument for refusing to admit the existence of fixed and constant
emotional contents. Rime may be dift'erently perceived at dif-
ferent times, for each time it is forced to co-operate with a dift'erent
emotional state of mind,—it is differently prepared, we may say.
Yet— if it is active at all— it affects any state of mind in a definite
way that never changes. It is not exactly a special mood or an iso-
lated emotion that is forever connected with the given rime, but a
certain mode of emotional cooperation, certain fixed and definite zvay
of modifying other emotion.
W'hat has been shown with regard to music and poetry can be
easily applied to other emotions. Every emotion must have a con-
tent. This may be regarded as the fundamental axiom of the logic
of emotions. Further on, the evidence that was obtained for the
emotional contents which appear in music and poetry can be easily
generalised. It can be shown in a general way that (\) the content
of emotions is independent of our consciousness, and (2) it is of
an a-logical character.
Proposition 1. (Declaration of Indrpendcncr). Although the
content of emotions is given to us through mental processes, it is
not dependent on those processes for its being, or nature.
This proposition may be supported by the following argument
:
It is axiomatically, and without reservations, admitted by psychol-
ogists that "fear", "love", etc., are mental processes, or manifesta-
tions of consciousness. And yet what is consciousness? Psy-
chologists till now can nol agree as to llic meaning of the term.
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Every psychological school—and they are very numerous—-has its
own conception of what mental process or consciousness should be.
Behaviorists refuse to admit that consciousness exists at all. An
average man knows nothnig of mental processes. And yet, every
one knows what fear it, and knows it very definitely without the
inherent vagueness of the psychological theories. We have the tes-
timony of an ancient fairy tale that a man who knows not what
fear is, is but a fool. Nobody in the days of fairy tales would re-
gard a man particularly foolish for not knowing what "mental
process" means.
Psychologists claim that our mental processes are "immediately
given" to us. There is revealed in this assertion a remarkable in-
ability of philosophical minds to draw a line betv/een facts and
(lieories,—remarkable especially in view of their incessant argument
about this very distinction. There is nothing surprising that men
of science grow suspicious whenever a philosopher begins to speak
of "facts". It is quite possible that men of science often commit
the same fallacy
;
yet there is nothing surprising in it as it is not their
business to know the distinction. A philosopher ought to be more
cautious. Speaking of mental processes he ought to remember that
they appeared comparatively late in the history of human knowledge,
that ancient Greeks knew nearly nothing about those "facts", and
that there was a great deal of thinking necessary to grasp tlie dis-
tinction between the inner and outer world. Till now the distinction
is very far from being clear, and every philosophical school, nearly
every individual psychologist, have different conceptions of what
inner life, consciousness, or mental processes should be. That shows
that "consciousness" is, not a given fact, but a doctrine, a theory
obtainable only through learning, and a great deal of learning. It
is not a "sensation" that is immediately given to us, but red and
blue rough and smooth, loud or soft. "Sensation" is a psychologi-
cal theory (and not a very clear one) that is superimposed upon
those immediate facts. Consciousness is a giver that in itself is never
given.
For similar reasons the content of an emotion must be different
from its psychological nature,—different precisely in the same sense
in which red is different from sensation. It is not the emotion that
is given to us, but "fear" or "love", "courage" or "hate", "hope" or
"despair". What psychologists call emotion is not at all a mere
generalization obtained by abstraction from those underlying facts.
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For there is not much to generaUze from hope and despair. It is
not a generalization, but a hypothesis. And hving through a fear
we certainly do not live through a hypothesis.
It may be objected, however, that "fear" is an emotion. Of
course, we shall reply. But it is also true that space is a perception.
And yet this proposition, though true, does not prove a single item in
the system of geometry. For mathematicians in dealing with space
"take consciousness into parenthesis" and forget all about their
perceptions, which never appear in either their arguments or proves.
Similarly a man who is in love can hardly derive anything from his
knowledge of psychology that would have any bearing upon his
happiness. Yet he can derive a great deal of practical and useful
knowledge from literature, which deals largely with the content and
genuine structure of love, and not at all with its "psychology".
Proposition 2. The content of emotions, although a legitimate
subject for theoretical analysis, can not be intellectually compre-
hended. It can be logically discussed, but cannot be grasped by logic
or expressed by a theory.
One who says "fear" attaches certain meaning to the word.
Referring to this meaning, i. e., discussing fear one is not supposed
at the moment of discussion to live through an actual experience of
fear. One may fairly intelligently discuss fear without being actually
afraid of anthing or anybody. This is a purely theoretical situation
in which nothing but meanings are involved. From this situation ac-
tual experience of fear is entirely different, and whoever lives through
this experience knows that he, not merely means, but feels fear.
There is something present in his experience that goes far beyond
logic, something that cannot be logically accounted for. One who
loves and enjoys music knows that no logical terms, no theory
whatsoever can "explain" a meUidy. One must actually or mentally
feel the melody in order to grasp it. No logical terms can possibly
give it to us. One who says "Sigfried melody" attaches definite
meaning to his words. Those are not merely words, but words with
a definite logical meaning. And in the realms of logical concepts
there is a concept that corresponds to these words. Yet that concept
itself is merely a symbol. To indicate the Sigfried melody itself,
words and concepts are not sufficient. We need musical signs. And
one wlio reads those signs reads directly the melody itself.
Now in conclusion, let us briefly discuss the application of the
ab(i\c proposition (o the gcncTnl pn'l)lcms of aesthetics. The value
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of the first proposition consists in establishing independence for a
large realm of phenomena which otherwise appear in constant dan-
ger of psychological attacks. Psychological treatment substituting
theories for facts shifts all problems to a different level, and often
makes us forget the original issue ; instead of analysing the structure
of what is actually given to us in our artistic experience, or other-
wise, we, under the eitect of psychological fallacy, begin to analyze
the process of experience itself. To avoid this error, in aesthetic
especially, it is well to have the truth of the first proposition con-
stantly in view.
The second proposition guarantees a correct method for dealing
with many objects of art. There are three ways of enjoying an ar-
tistic work. The first is when we simply and naively enjoy a work
of art without trying to "understand'' anything beyond what is
immediately given to us in form of enjoyment. This is, perhaps,
the most adequate, and I should say, the most sympathetic way of
approaching art. For that is precisely what the artist expects us to
do. There is another, professional way of approaching an artistic
work, which is based on training, and study of technique and his-
tory. This professional way, by no means, interferes with the naive
enjoyment. It merely opens for enjoyment new points which other-
wise may escape our attention, and makes our appreciation of the
work more thorough and profitable. There is, however, a middle
way betwen these two, which is neither naive, nor professional and
consequently not at all belonging to the proper territory of art. It
consists of "understanding" reached through "philosophy" and based
on "profound interpretations". People who are dull and unartistic
and unable to feel the content immediately given to them in mu-
sic, or poetry, often wish to prove their "intelligent" reaction by
what they claim to be mystical revelations. Tbey substitute their
cheap symbols and commonplace images for the genuine content of
great works. And thus, the tragic harmonies of Sonato op. 27, are
brought down to the level of a pictorial moonlight-melodrama that
might be successfully used for advertising Ivory Soap, or Packard
cars. To avoid such illegitimate substitutions it is highly important
to realise that emotions can not be properly "understood", but merely
emoved, or lived through in a manner accessible only for emotions.
